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Professeur
Professeur
Courriel : dellis.arnaud@uqam.ca
Téléphone : (514) 987-3000 poste 8364
Local : DS-5915
Langues :
Français, Anglais
Domaines d'expertise
Liens d'intérêt
Informations générales
Cheminement académique
Ph. D. Economics, Cornell University (USA), 2004.
M. A. Economics, DELTA (currently Paris School of Economics) (France), 1996.
B. A. Economics, Université de Liège (Belgium), 1995.
Unités de recherche
- Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi (CIRPÉE)
Affiliations externes principales
Enseignement
- Microeconomie i (2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019)
- Economie publique (2015, 2016, 2017)
- Microeconomie avancee ii (2017, 2018, 2019)
- Micro-economie iii (2019)
Distinctions
- International Institute of Public Finance, Peggy and Richard Musgrave award, 2005.
- General Mills Foundation, Award for exemplary graduate assistant teaching, 2004.
- Cornell University, Sage fellowship, 1999-2004.
- Belgian American Educational Foundation, Honorary fellowship, 1999-2000.
Publications
Articles scientifiques
- Dellis, A. et Oak, M. Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization. Social Choice and Welfare.
Notes: à venir - Dellis, A. (2013). The two-party system under alternative voting procedures. Social Choice and Welfare, 40(1), 263–284. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0597-3.
- Dellis, A., D'Evelyn, S. et Sherstyuk, K. (2011). Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system : An experiment. Social Choice and Welfare, 37(2), 171–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0489-y.
- Dellis, A. (2010). Weak undominance in scoring rule elections. Mathematical Social Sciences, 59(1), 110–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.11.002.
- Dellis, A. (2009). The salient issue of issue salience. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11(2), 203–231. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01407.x.
- Dellis, A. (2009). Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? Journal of Economic Theory, 144(2), 772–801. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.002.
- Dellis, A. (2007). Blame-game politics in a coalition government. Journal of Public Economics, 91(1-2), 77–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.08.006.
Notes: reçu le prix : the Peggy and Richard Musgrave award 2005 - Dellis, A. et Oak, M. (2007). Policy convergence under Approval and Plurality Voting : the role of policy commitment. Social Choice and Welfare, 29(2), 229–245. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0203-2.
- Dellis, A. et Oak, M. (2006). Approval voting with endogenous candidates. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(1), 47–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.010.
- Dellis, A., Desmet, R., Jousten, A. et Perelman, S. (2003). Analyse de la cessation d’activité en Belgique. Revue française d’économie, 18(1), 99–132. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/rfeco.2003.1480.
- Dellis, A., Cremer, M. et Pestieau, P. (2003). Family size and optimal income taxation. Journal of Population Economics, 16(1), 37–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001480100113.
- Dellis, A. (2002). Comptabilité générationnelle en Europe. Economie et Prévision, (154), 25–30. Récupéré de http://www.cairn.info/revue-economie-et-prevision-2002-3-page-25.htm.
Chapitres de livre
- Dellis, A. (2010). Policy moderation and endogenous candidacy in Approval Voting elections. Dans J.-F. Laslier et R. Sanver (dir.). Handbook on Approval Voting (p. 431–451). Springer.
- Dellis, A. et Pestieau, P. (2006). Economic growth and population growth. Dans G. Caselli, J. Vallin et G. Wunsch (dir.). Demography : Analysis and Synthesis III (p. 361–372). Waltham : Academic Press.
- Dellis, A. et Pestieau, P. (2004). Croissance économique et croissance démographique. Dans G. Caselli, J. Vallin et G. Wunsch (dir.). Démographie : Analyse et Synthèse VI. Paris : INED.
- Dellis, A., Desmet, R., Jousten, A. et Perelman, S. (2004). Micro-modeling of retirement in Belgium. Dans J. Gruber et D. Wise (dir.). Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: Micro-estimation. Chicago : NBER and University of Chicago Press.